The Political Logic of Continued Confinement of Imran Khan

The Cost of Khan’s Release, Construction of Medical Narrative, and Alternative Explanations

 

Imran Khan’s freedom would create an existential political problem for Mūqṭadira. The present structure depends on keeping Khan imprisoned, politically isolated, physically weakened, and institutionally separated from PTI. Khan has shown no willingness to accept an arrangement requiring submission to military authority, abandonment of his political position, or conversion into a controlled political actor. The Supreme Court decision therefore provides no factual basis for the claim that Mūqṭadira has reconciled with Khan through an agreement accepted by him.

 

Mūqṭadira is not dismantling the PMLN government to restore Imran Khan to power. The PMLN leadership and the present military leadership remain politically interdependent. The PMLN requires the existing institutional arrangement for governmental survival, while Mūqṭadira requires a compliant civilian political structure capable of sustaining the present distribution of authority. The PMLN will consequently remain politically relevant through the next election. Electoral management can again distribute political space between the PMLN and PPP, while PTI figures considered ‘compliant’ can receive political accommodation according to the progress of the effort to separate PTI from Imran Khan.

 

The central objective remains the political removal of Imran Khan with or without formally eliminating PTI. PTI can continue to exist as a parliamentary organization, provincial government, electoral vehicle, and political label while Khan remains unable to control its leadership, determine its decisions, direct public mobilisation, or enforce political discipline. Mūqṭadira’s influence over PTI politicians becomes substantially easier under conditions in which Khan remains incarcerated and communication with him remains controlled.

 

Khan’s imprisonment is being used to damage his physical capacity as well as his political authority. Directly killing Khan while he remains in state custody would create an immediate attribution problem for Mūqṭadira. A custodial death would place responsibility directly on it. It would also create nationwide unrest, specifically in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), on a scale that Mūqṭadira could not reliably contain. Any perception that he had been killed in custody could produce a severe breakdown in relations between the KP population and Mūqṭadira. The resulting confrontation could threaten administrative control, political authority, LEAs’ mobility, and the security environment surrounding cantonments and other security installations. These consequences make an overt custodial killing politically hazardous.

 

The method therefore depends on gradual physical deterioration accompanied by progressive construction of a public medical narrative. Reports of illness, weakness, blood-pressure problems, deteriorating eyesight, hospitalisation, and declining health can establish a record through which a subsequent medical emergency appears medically explicable. A future announcement of a heart attack, organ failure, or comparable medical crisis would then occur within an already established narrative of natural deterioration. Wajahat Saeed Khan has already circulated a false report concerning Khan’s death that was attributed by critics to information originating from GHQ-linked channels. The political function of such a narrative would be to complicate direct attribution of responsibility.

 

The sequence of recent events is interpreted within this framework. Despite fool-proof control, the information concerning Khan’s illness and eyesight emerged from prison and was subsequently placed before the court and circulated through the media. These developments as coordinated elements of an institutional communications operation. A subsequent partial medical report could serve two (02) simultaneous functions — preserve the public impression that official channels were providing medical information and strengthen PTI actors presented as credible intermediaries between Khan, the authorities, and the public.

 

The proposed transfer of Khan to Shifa International Hospital fits the same sequence. Hospitalisation at an institution selected by his family would create the appearance that his medical treatment had been transferred into a family-approved clinical environment. His sisters could then be presented as participants in the treatment process, while Mūqṭadira could reduce direct public association between prison conditions and his deteriorating health.

 

A short period at Shifa would also permit the public narrative of serious illness to become established through medical visits, controlled disclosures, selective briefings, and potentially some carefully selected photographs. A photograph showing visible physical weakness could later acquire substantial political and evidentiary value because it would establish public familiarity with the proposition that Khan had already become medically fragile.

 

The hospital transfer therefore has significance beyond immediate treatment within the theory advanced here. It can establish illness as an accepted public fact, associate the family with the medical process, create documentary distance from prison medical management, and prepare the political environment for subsequent deterioration after his return to Adiala Jail.

 

Khan would then be returned to Adiala after the hospital period. Meetings with his sisters, lawyers, and selected PTI politicians could resume under controlled conditions. Such access would provide the authorities with an effective instrument of political regulation because meetings, medical information, communication rights, and family access remain dependent on custodial permission.

 

Public communication would consequently become an indicator of the arrangement. Statements from Khan and his sisters directly accusing Mūqṭadira of responsibility for his condition could disappear. Their silence under such circumstances would not establish political reconciliation. It would remain compatible with a system in which access to Khan, information concerning his health, and opportunities to meet him are conditioned by the authorities controlling his detention.

 

The same mechanism applies to PTI politicians. Selected and ‘compliant’ figures can receive access to Khan and subsequently claim his approval, confidence, or political endorsement. They can therefore be permitted to meet Khan and then publicly state that Khan expressed satisfaction with their performance and endorsed their political conduct. Such statements would provide them with political legitimacy derived from Khan while leaving Khan without an independent channel through which to confirm, qualify, or reject the account.

 

The 27 September protest decision will indicate the operation’s status. If the operation proceeds as planned, the protest will be cancelled. PTI politicians will present hospitalization, renewed family access, political meetings, and medical treatment as achievements resulting from their intervention. Alternatively, the military will permit the protest to proceed under controlled conditions to establish an alternative public explanation. The accusations of betrayal could be suppressed through claims that negotiation and institutional accommodation had produced tangible benefits for Khan.

 

This arrangement would permit ‘compliant’ PTI politicians to strengthen their position within the party while continuing to invoke Khan’s authority. PTI would remain formally associated with Imran Khan while its parliamentary leadership, provincial administration, organizational machinery, and legislative representatives operate within parameters acceptable to Mūqṭadira. The assemblies and the senate could consequently contain PTI representatives functioning within the same institutional order maintained by the military command. Formal political opposition would remain visible, while the principal source of independent political authority inside PTI would remain physically confined and operationally restricted.

 

It is a coordinated process of physical attrition, controlled medical access, communications management, political isolation, organizational capture, selective reconfiguration of PTI figures, and gradual construction of a public narrative concerning Khan’s declining health. Prolonged imprisonment performs several functions simultaneously. It removes Khan from direct political activity. It prevents him from exercising effective control over PTI. It enables the authorities to determine who can meet him and who can claim to represent his views. It permits selected politicians to acquire legitimacy through controlled access. It creates conditions under which deterioration in his health can occur beyond sustained public observation.

 

The political utility for Mūqṭadira is evident within this framework. Khan remains alive, imprisoned, weakened, and unable to exercise unrestricted political authority. PTI remains available as a controlled parliamentary structure. Its politicians remain capable of participating in provincial and federal institutions. Mūqṭadira avoids the immediate consequences of formally eliminating the party while neutralising the individual around whom its mass political legitimacy remains concentrated.

 

Therefore, the imprisonment itself has become the mechanism through which Khan is being progressively incapacitated. The objective is to preserve sufficient physical survival to avoid the immediate consequences of a custodial death while producing sufficient deterioration to reduce his capacity to return as an effective political actor.

 

Journalists, political intermediaries, party officeholders, custodial authorities, and Mūqṭadira -linked communicators each perform a distinct function within this structure. Some circulate medical information. Some validate selected narratives. Some claim access to Khan. Some manage political mobilisation. Some present accommodation with the authorities as loyalty to Khan. Some normalize prolonged detention as an established political condition.

 

The resulting arrangement produces a PTI organizationally present but personally separated from Imran Khan. It produces a political system in which Khan’s electoral mandate remains useful to politicians who invoke his name while his capacity to control those politicians remains constrained. It produces a Mūqṭadira capable of managing both the government and substantial elements of the opposition through control over the conditions under which Khan remains detained.

 

The preceding assessment offers one explanation. Alternative explanations remain relevant because the same developments may result from internal realignment within Mūqṭadira, external diplomatic pressure, economic exposure, and regional intervention.

 

Some informed observers compare the present situation with institutional realignments following the dissolution of Mohammad Khan Junejo’s assemblies in 1988 and the lawyers’ movement during 2007–2009. Both periods demonstrated that institutional preservation can require the removal or abandonment of an individual whose continued position imposes excessive political and organisational costs.

 

Comparable pressures may exist within the present command structure. A highly influential officeholder is scheduled to retire on 7 October, while reports indicate resistance to retirement and competition among three (03) individuals seeking succession. Comparisons have also been drawn with the relationship between Gen. Kayani and Gen. Musharraf during the final phase of Musharraf’s political authority. Gen. Amir Raza’s appointment as Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC), superseding seven (07) three-star generals, adds a further institutional variable. None of the superseded officers has resigned, indicating that the immediate consequences remain contained within the command structure while succession dynamics continue to develop. Under this explanation, any relief for Khan would result from an internal calculation concerning succession, command cohesion, institutional credibility, and distribution of authority within Mūqṭadira.

 

A second explanation concerns the November 2026 United States elections. Donald Trump has political incentives to demonstrate responsiveness to constituencies of Pakistani origin, while Pakistan remains exposed to American diplomatic, financial, military, and political leverage. Pressure from Washington could therefore influence decisions concerning Khan’s treatment, access, hospitalisation, or even release.

 

A third explanation concerns Pakistan’s GSP+ relationship with the European Union. Preferential market access remains linked to compliance with international conventions governing human rights, labour protections, governance, and fundamental freedoms. Allegations concerning political detention, custodial treatment, restrictions on civil liberties, and denial of medical access can therefore generate direct diplomatic and commercial consequences. Relief for Khan could reduce European scrutiny and protect Pakistan’s trade interests.

 

A fourth explanation concerns reported Saudi involvement. Any Saudi engagement requires assessment within Pakistan’s wider relationship with Riyadh, regional normalisation initiatives, the Abraham Accords, developments in Yemen, and broader Gulf security calculations. Saudi intervention could therefore reflect regional considerations extending beyond Pakistan’s domestic political contest.

 

These options would represent consequential choices for Mūqṭadira and would likely emerge only under substantial institutional, external pressure, or both. They nevertheless converge on one conclusion: none requires Khan to accept Mūqṭadira’s political authority, institutional terms, or conditions of political submission. Possible relief would originate from changes in the calculations of actors capable of altering his present condition. Domestic and international actors may increasingly assess Khan’s continued exclusion as generating political, institutional, diplomatic, economic, and security costs exceeding the utility of his confinement. Any resulting change would therefore reflect a recalculation by those actors, not evidence of Khan’s capitulation.

 

Mūqṭadira and Imran Khan have both demonstrated capacity for major policy reversals (U-Turns) when political conditions and incentives change materially. Abrupt changes in custodial policy, institutional alignment, political accommodation, and electoral positioning therefore remain possible.

 

Khan may remain in Adiala Jail, undergo hospital treatment, secure release, regain unrestricted political communication, or return to national political office. The decisive indicators remain his physical safety, medical independence, access to family and lawyers, freedom of communication, and political autonomy. Khan’s refusal to accept political submission, personal dependency, or conversion into a controlled political actor remains unchanged. That position continues to define the confrontation and provides the principal measure against which any future settlement, concession, or release must be assessed.

 

 

Pakistan’s Permanent Stability-in-Instability Equilibrium

 Pakistan’s Permanent Stability-in-Instability Equilibrium

Metastable Monopoly of Military Establishment

 

Hassan Saleem Awan

July 11, 2026

 

(Brutus declared, “Not that I loved Caesar less, but that I loved Rome more.” In the same spirit, I submit: not that I honour the armed forces less, but that I honour Pakistan more. My words do not arise from hostility, rebellion, or resentment. They arise from fidelity to my country and from the conviction that institutions entrusted with the nation's survival bear the highest obligation to preserve not merely their strength, but their legitimacy. The armed forces remain the principal guarantor of Pakistan's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the last line of our national defence. Precisely because their role is indispensable, their institutional credibility must remain beyond erosion. History demonstrates that power attains permanence not through coercion alone, but through restraint, constitutional discipline, and enduring public trust. Silence in the presence of strategic drift is not loyalty; it is acceptance. Uncritical admiration is not patriotism; it is abdication of civic responsibility. Genuine respect for an institution requires the willingness to identify structural vulnerabilities before they mature into irreversible crises. This analysis is therefore neither an indictment nor an act of defiance. It is a caution grounded in national interest, offered in the belief that the highest form of loyalty is not unquestioning obedience, but honest counsel directed toward the long-term preservation of both the institution and the State it exists to defend.)

 

One institution, after almost eight (08) decades of continuous consolidation, operates as the single centre of power within the state. Its command spans politics, defence, legislation, bureaucracy, judiciary, economy, diplomacy, agriculture, industry, media, and even religion. The institution has attained a dominance that renders effective confrontation impossible. Historical evidence confirms that every attempt to restore constitutionally prescribed limits has failed. Former establishment figures, institutional elders, and deep-state chaperones have been neutralised. The politicians have entered operational partnerships with the institution. Organised pressure groups such as lawyers, business federations, media houses, and trade unions have been reduced to compliance. No autonomous centre of power remains outside the institution’s orbit.

 

No external power possesses the capability or the incentive to dismantle this institutional stranglehold. The United States, China, and Saudi Arabia each derive geopolitical utility from a stable, transactional interlocutor. Their preference for stability subordinates any interest in domestic political reordering. External financial flows — IMF programmes, geopolitical rents, bilateral liquidity injections — supply this system with the resources required for perpetuation.

                                                                                                                              

However, no measures can be initiated under conditions of institutional normality. A triggering crisis is a necessary precondition — a severe economic collapse, mass mobilisation, or a succession struggle during the transition of power. The civilian bloc must possess a pre-codified transition plan ready for immediate deployment during that narrow window. Absent a complete political blueprint prepared in advance and debated openly in the public domain, the institution will reconsolidate control within seventy-two (72) hours, as it has after every prior opening. A plan that remains undeclared permits the institution to feign ignorance or negotiate selectively.

 

The alternative trajectory is managed decline. The state persists as a hybrid entity until an external shock — sovereign default, climate catastrophe, natural disaster, or cross-border conflict — enforces a chaotic reconfiguration under conditions far less favourable than those that could be shaped by design.

 

The preceding framework presupposes actors possessing sufficient autonomy, capacity, and will to act. The ground reality eliminates this presupposition. The institution exercises control over all levers of power without exception. Any attempt to confront it meets definitive failure. All potential countervailing forces — establishment elders, politicians, pressure groups — are neutralised, co-opted, or submissive.

 

Under these constraints, any plan to contain the institution constitutes only a theoretical construct with zero feasibility. Every required mechanism depends on an agent that does not exist in autonomous form: a parliamentary supermajority prepared to legislate de-monopolisation; an independent judicial bloc willing to reverse institutional capture; a unified civilian front capable of enforcing a single-issue compact. Politicians in partnership with the institution will not enact de-monopolisation. A judiciary under institutional influence will not dismantle the parallel legal hierarchy. Submissive pressure groups provide no mobilizational base.

 

Seventy-eight (78) years of historical evidence corroborate this assessment. The institution has co-opted or crushed every challenge. The system is a self-contained cycle designed to preclude the emergence of the disruption that any framework requires. Internal reform is impossible. The system can terminate only through exogenous rupture — state failure triggered by sovereign default, ecological collapse, catastrophic natural disaster, or large-scale external conflict. Even then, the institution may reconstitute itself as a predatory survival entity rather than relinquish power. No plan, blueprint, or pact can be deployed because no independent platform to formulate, communicate, or enforce it exists within the monopoly.

 

The impossibility of deliberate reform does not imply system stasis. Change, if it materialises, assumes the form of a blind, endogenous process arising from the institution’s internal contradictions. The central contradiction is structural: the institution operates simultaneously as a monopolist and as a cartel. A pure monopolist exhibits unified command and frictionless coordination. A cartel consists of multiple internal nodes that compete for rents, turf, and succession advantages while collectively preserving an external monopoly.

 

Under cartel conditions, several dynamics intensify. Intelligence factions, defence housing authorities, and commercial fiefdoms engage in resource competition. Vertical patronage chains clash during succession episodes, potentially fracturing command authority. Each node extracts maximal rent, accelerating the fiscal depletion of the host state through economic cannibalisation. Should cartel dynamics intensify to the point where internal cohesion ruptures — without any civilian intervention — the monopoly fragments from within. This outcome represents a structural fault line embedded in the system’s own design.

 

Historical comparators illustrate the range of possible trajectories. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army after the 1990s suppressed cartel tendencies and restored monopolistic discipline. Imperial Japan’s military was dismantled through external imposition following defeat. The post-Soviet Tajik military imploded into warlordism. The present case excludes both external dismantling and the suppression of cartel behaviour by a unified, monolithic, monopolistic authority. The sole remaining trajectory under the given axioms is eventual self-cannibalisation, leading to state fragmentation. Civilian restoration is not a plausible terminal state.

 

This is a terminal diagnosis. The described system permits no non-terminal outcome initiated by domestic agency. The only residual possibility involves an external shock of sufficient magnitude to dissolve the institution’s control capacity entirely — a nuclear exchange, the blockade of external financial sources, or climate-induced mass mortality. Even then, the aftermath constitutes a scramble among remnants.

 

The self-cannibalisation thesis remains incomplete without accounting for the behaviour of external powers. Regional and global actors function as a systemic check on internal collapse. The cartel dynamic of competing internal nodes racing to extract rents generates a trajectory toward a fiscal cliff. However, the fact that regional and global powers engage exclusively with this institution imposes a hard operational constraint: they will not permit the institution’s collapse to advance to the point where it loses its functional utility as a unitary partner.

 

As the fiscal cliff approaches — marked by default risk, currency free-fall, or social unrest threatening command integrity — external patrons activate stabilisation mechanisms. The IMF, operating through a US-led executive board, supplies conditional liquidity. China injects funds through CPEC-related facilities. Saudi Arabia provides oil payment deferrals and central bank deposits. These interventions preserve the single interlocutor capable of ensuring nuclear command security, delivering counterterrorism outcomes, and maintaining the geostrategic equilibrium across Afghanistan, Kashmir, and the broader India-balancing framework.

 

The cartel nodes understand this dynamic with precision. Their extraction race is bounded by the calibrated threshold that predictably triggers a bailout. The logic operates as follows: extract at maximal rates, periodically manufacture a crisis of sufficient severity to acquire external funds, and resume extraction under the renewed resource base.

 

The institution has evolved a self-stabilising extractive equilibrium. The cycle proceeds through five phases: cartel nodes extract rents, degrading state capacity; degradation generates a crisis; the crisis is leveraged to secure external bailouts; the bailout replenishes the common resource pool; the cycle resets. This sequence repeats indefinitely, eroding the civilian state’s developmental capacity while preserving the institution’s monopoly and internal cohesion. The commons-based tragedy never fully materialises because an external commons — strategic rent — remains perpetually accessible, and the institution controls the sole conduit through which it flows. No internal cartel node possesses an incentive to terminate the host state; each node possesses an incentive to maintain the host in a condition of chronic debilitation, dependency, and precise calibration for recurrent external infusions.

 

The resultant system is a “metastable” regime. External powers function as the ultimate guarantor against terminal collapse. The equilibrium is a deliberate realpolitik condition in which the military-security establishment, patronage networks, nuclear deterrence, and external backstops prevent state collapse while tolerating recurring political, economic, and security crises. Instability is functional: elites use it to justify extraordinary powers, extract rents, and manage rivals. The equilibrium is sustained because the costs of systemic reform are concentrated among powerful actors while the benefits are diffuse, so elites prefer containment to transformation.

 

The institution’s control of all levers ensures that endogenous threats are neutralised. Political crises, economic downturns, or civil unrest cannot escalate into existential challenges because the institution co-opts, crushes, or resets any emergent force. Cartel rent-extraction is calibrated to trigger bailouts rather than terminal collapse. Nuclear deterrence provides an existential floor that enables sub-conventional risk-taking, reinforcing the institution’s indispensability. Elite co-option and adaptive repression prevent counter-elite formation. Cartel cohesion persists because no node will destroy the collective monopoly that secures external rents. Fragility accumulates — human capital erosion, infrastructure decay, fiscal space depletion — but does not produce near-term collapse because the external intervention mechanisms activate pre-emptively. This is the “stability-in-instability equilibrium” in its internal operation: a self-stabilising extractive cycle that resists both reform and rupture.

 

The stability-in-instability equilibrium delivers a composite strategic good to external powers. A single, identifiable institutional hierarchy provides a unified counterparty that enforces commitments without the friction of parliamentary ratification, judicial review, or electoral volatility. This structure eliminates the uncertainty of democratic transitions and guarantees policy continuity irrespective of the civilian government in office. External capitals bypass domestic political noise and secure binding agreements with the top leadership of the institution, knowing the political class will not obstruct. Periodic engineered political crises — parliamentary dissolutions, judicial ousters, caretaker setups — reset the political chessboard without altering the underlying monopoly, preserving contractual reliability. The predictability of this arrangement is the primary political dividend.

 

Pakistan’s geographic position demands a single actor capable of policing borders, regulating militant infrastructure, and managing nuclear assets. The metastable monopoly guarantees that the United States retains over-the-horizon counterterrorism access and overflight rights for different regional operations. China secures territorial integrity for CPEC routes from Kashgar to Gwadar. Saudi Arabia and Gulf states maintain a Sunni-majority nuclear balancer against Iranian influence and a potential source of expeditionary force packages. The institution’s control of foreign policy ensures that no geopolitical alignment shifts without its consent. Chronic instability — proxy warfare against India, managed Islamist militancy — is tolerated because it does not cross the nuclear escalation threshold and provides points of leverage. Pakistan’s dependency on geopolitical rents ensures its foreign policy remains responsive to patron demands, particularly when the institution must demonstrate utility to secure bailouts.

 

The institution’s commercial empire correlates with external investment strategies. Chinese CPEC projects are routed through special-purpose vehicles that interface with military-controlled land and security logistics. Gulf investors negotiating agricultural land or real estate deals receive sovereign guarantees that the civilian bureaucracy cannot independently provide. The metastable equilibrium ensures selective economic liberalisation: sectors competing with military interests remain closed, while those that complement or can be captured by military-led consortia open on terms favourable to external partners. The fiscal fragility produced by the extractive structure is sustained by the International Financial Institution (IFI) packages whose conditionalities force periodic deregulation, asset sales, and austerity, creating entry points for external capital at distressed valuations. The system delivers undervalued state assets to domestic military conglomerates and their external joint-venture partners.

 

Trade policy — tariff regimes, port access, transit agreements — is regulated by the institution’s calculus. External trading partners benefit from a single-window clearance model for major trade corridor decisions. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement, the China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement, and the stalled India-Pakistan trade normalisation reflect institutional priorities. Instability components — periodic border closures, regulatory unpredictability, security-driven disruptions — do not deter partners who negotiate preferential access insulated from public scrutiny. Competitor nations face elevated risk premiums, ceding market share to aligned powers. The military’s own logistics and front companies operate in fast-track lanes while generic commercial players absorb the costs of customs delays and political strikes. The result is a de-facto trade discrimination regime aligning trade flows with the interests of the institution and its external underwriters.

 

The nuclear arsenal constitutes the irreducible strategic asset. The United States requires a coherent, hierarchical chain of command to guarantee non-use, non-leakage, and non-diversion — precisely what the metastable monopoly provides. China leverages a nuclear-armed Pakistan as a counterweight to India, absorbing Indian conventional force attention and preventing a two-front challenge. The stability-instability paradox is a structural feature: nuclear stability at the strategic level permits sub-conventional risk-taking, generating perpetual crisis diplomacy that external powers can mediate and monetise. The institution’s control of militant groups enables calibrated escalation against India and Afghanistan, creating leverage in bilateral negotiations. External powers prefer this managed instability over total peace — which would eliminate Pakistan’s leverage and dependency — or total war — which risks nuclear escalation. Crises such as the 2019 Balakot Exchange and the May 2025 Pahalgam Standoff provide controlled pressure releases that reinforce the institution’s indispensability while keeping escalation within manageable bounds.

 

The institution’s monopoly over defence procurement structures the global arms market. China has become the dominant supplier because centralised procurement can execute long-term, multi-platform deals — JF-17 co-production, Type 039 submarines, CH-4 drones — without the competitive bidding or political scrutiny that a civilian government might impose. The United States retains influence through F-16 sustainment and counterterrorism equipment, extracting deliverables in return. Saudi Arabia and other Guld states access Pakistani military personnel via the institution’s monopoly over secondments and retirement pathways. Defence budget opacity permits off-the-books joint ventures that bind external defence industries to the institution’s commercial interests, creating a self-reinforcing loop that deepens procurement relationships with external suppliers who, in return, provide diplomatic endorsement for the institution’s domestic dominance.

 

The metastable monopoly represents the optimal configuration for external powers operating under power-maximising premises. A fully democratic Pakistan with genuine civilian supremacy would introduce policy volatility — potentially an independent Kashmir initiative, normalised trade with India, or reduced tolerance for militant proxies — that would disrupt the calculations of Washington, Beijing, and Riyadh. A collapsed Pakistan would generate unmanageable externalities: nuclear weapons at risk of diversion, mass refugee flows, jihadist networks in ungoverned territory, and the loss of the CPEC transit corridor. The current equilibrium avoids both extremes. It provides a reliable, coercive, financially dependent partner that enforces internal order, manages nuclear assets, delivers tactical security outcomes, and absorbs shocks. The institution’s monopoly ensures that the costs of Pakistan’s dysfunction — inflation, unemployment, infrastructure decay, human capital erosion — are internalised by its population, while the benefits of its geopolitical function are exported to external powers. External patrons receive geopolitical rent — security, access, leverage, corridor protection — while the burdens are borne by a populace whose political voice is neutralised. The arrangement is rationally sustained because the alternatives impose higher costs on the patrons.

 

The metastable monopoly is a self-contained loop in which internal cartelised extraction and external patronage imperatives reinforce each other. The institution’s domestic total control prevents the emergence of any reformist agent, while its cartel structure generates fiscal crises that activate external bailouts. External powers, valuing a unified, dependable, and dependent interlocutor, supply the liquidity that re-stabilises the system. The cartel nodes understand this mechanism and calibrate their extraction to the threshold that triggers the next infusion. The cycle repeats indefinitely, eroding developmental capacity without producing terminal collapse.

 

The equilibrium persists because it resolves a fundamental principal-agent problem. The institution is sufficiently autonomous to enforce internal compliance, sufficiently constrained by fiscal dependency to remain responsive to patron demands, and sufficiently permanent to guarantee long-term contractual reliability. For external powers, this configuration is rationally superior to any alternative — a democratically empowered civilian government pursuing independent policies, a collapsed state exporting chaos, or a fragmented warlord landscape unable to secure nuclear assets or infrastructure corridors.

 

Thus, the domestic monopoly-cartel pathology and the external patronage structure converge into a single operational entity. The internal dysfunction and the external sustaining mechanisms are inseparable. Pakistan’s stability-in-instability is not a transitional phase awaiting resolution. It is a permanent metastable equilibrium. It will endure as long as the institution retains its dual character and as long as external powers calculate that the strategic goods delivered by a managed, dependent Pakistan outweigh the costs of its dysfunction. No internal reform pathway exists. No external intervention will dismantle the arrangement. The future consists of managed cycles of extraction punctuated by externally funded stabilisation episodes, with the institution structurally immovable and the equilibrium locked in place by the converging incentives of domestic cartel actors and external patrons.

 

جانگلوس — پنجاب کی الف لیلی: ٹیلی ویژن پر جنسیت کے فروغ کے آغاز کی کوشش

 

جانگلوس — پنجاب کی الف لیلی: ٹیلی ویژن پر جنسیت کے فروغ کے آغاز کی کوشش

 

حسن سلیم اعوان

۰۳/۰۳/۲۰۲۳

 

جانگلوس: لکھنئو میں پیدا ہونے والے، اشتراکی اور بائیں بازو کے فلسفے سے متاثر شوکت صدیقی کا دو ہزار صفحات اور تین جلدوں پر مشتمل ایک ضخیم ناول ہے۔ یہ ناول ۱۹۷۷ء اور ۱۹۹۴ء کے درمیان تحریر کیا گیا لیکن حالات اور واقعات کی ترتیب ۱۹۵۴ کے آس پاس کے دور کی ہے۔ ۸۰ کی دہائی میں پاکستان ٹیلی ویژن نے جانگلوس کی ڈرامائی تشکیل کے بعد نشر کرنا شروع کیا لیکن محض ۱۸ اقساط نشر کرنے کے بعد  یہ ڈرامہ بند کر دیا۔ نمایاں اداکاروں میں شبیر جان، سلیم ناصر، ایم وارثی، اور شگفتہ شامل تھے۔ جانگلوس سسنکرت زبان کا لفظ  ہے۔ جس کے معنی ، جنگلی، وحشی، غیر مہذب ، اجڈ اور گنوار کے ہیں۔

 

یہ ناول پاکستان اور ہندوستان کی تخلیق کے نتیجے میں ہونے والی خونریز ہجرت، جاگیردارانہ نظام، نچلے طبقے کا سماجی، معاشی اور سیاسی استحصال، استبداد، استحصال زدہ طبقات کا جرائم کی جانب راغب ہونا، مجرموں کی نفسیات، ہندوستان سے ہجرت کر کے آنے والوں کی آبادکاری کے نام پر زمینوں اور جائیدادوں کی وسیع درجے کی خردبرد، معاشرے میں پائی جانے والی ضعیف الاعتقادی اور خواتین کے ہر طرح کے استحصال جیسے موضوعات کا ہی احاطہ نہیں کرتا بلکہ پنجاب، خاص طور پر وسطی پنجاب، کی انتہائی خوبصورت دیہی ثقافت اور بود،باش کو بہت مفصل پیرائے میں بیان کرتا ہے۔ وسطی پنجاب کی علاقائی اور جغرافیائی تقسیم (ماجھہ، دوآباہ وغیرہ)، زمیںن کی اقسام، وسطی پنجاب کی فصلیں، کاستکاری کے طریقے اور مسائل، موسم اور موسمی مسائل، شادی، بیاہ اور خوشی، غمی کی رسومات، میلے، پنجابی زبان کے مختلف لب،لہجے، روائیتی کھانے اور مشروبات، ملبوسات، ساز، گیت، لوک موسیقی، ذات اور برادریاں، مختلف ذات اور برادری کے لوگوں کی آپس کی دشمن داریاں، مہمان نوازی، ذات برادریوں کی تاریخ، ان کی آپس کی رشتے داریاں استوار کی کرنے کی تاریخ، سیاسی جوڑ،توڑ، ذرائع آمد،رفت، مختلف قصبوں کی تاریخی حیثیت اور طرز تعیمر وغیرہ جیسے تمام موضوعات کو انتہائی تفصیل سے بیان کیا گیا ہے۔ دوران مطالعہ قاری کبھی کبھار بجا طور پر غیرضروری طوالت سے اکتا سکتا ہے۔ معروف نقاد احمد سہیل نے جانگلوس کو پنجاب کی الف لیلی قرار دیا ہے۔

 

ہم نے پچھلے تین دنوں میں اس ضخیم ناول کو جو کئی سال پہلے بچپن میں ایک بار سرسری طور پر پڑھا تھا، دوبارہ لیکن بغور پڑھا ہے۔ چند دن پہلے دو مختلف لیکن ایک ہی مرکز کے گرد گھومتے موضوعات پر اپنے خیالات قلمبند کرنے کی کوشش کی۔ ایک موضوع موجودہ دور میں معلومات اور ذرائع ابلاغ کو بطور ہتھیار استعمال کرنا اور دوسرا موضوع پاکستانی عوام کی ذہن سازی، عمومی رائے، اور نظریات کو تبدیل کرنے سے متعلق تھا۔ دوسرا مضمون کامسیٹس اور علامہ اقبال یونیورسٹی کے امتحانات میں پوچھے گئے سوالات کے پس منظر میں تھا۔ اسی دوران ایک سوال بار بار ذہن میں آ رہا تھا کہ میڈیا کے پاکستانی معاشرے میں جنسیت کے پھیلاؤ میں باقاعدہ کردار کا آغاز کب ہوا تھا۔ ہم محقق، ادیب اور نقاد ہر گز نہیں ہیں۔ اس لیئے کوئی دعوی بھی نہیں کر رہے۔ لیکن ہماری ناقص رائے میں جانگلوس وہ ڈرامہ ہے جو اس کام کا نکتہ آغاز تھا جس کی اٹھان ہم آج کل اپنے ٹیلی ویژن یا موبائل فون کی اسکرین پر دیکھتے ہیں۔

 

اگر آپ یہ ناول پڑھ چکے ہیں تو آپ کو ناول نگار کی جنسیت کو ہر پانچ دس صفحات کے بعد حد سے زیادہ معمول کا عمل بنانے کے بارے میں ضرور آگاہی ہو گی۔ اگر ہم اسے معاشرتی برائی، یا استحصالی، استبدادی طریقہ سمجھ کر نظر انداز بھی کرنا چاہیں تو ناول نگار کی غیر ازدواجی تعلقات کی (جسے ناول کے ایک باب میں 'اسسپینس نائٹ' کے نام سے بیان کیا ہے) کی دانستہ کوشش کو نظر انداز نہیں کر سکتے۔ جس کے لیئے عجیب، غریب قسم کی توجیحات پیش کی گئی ہیں۔ بات بہت سادہ سی ہے۔ جنسیت کا عمل ایک جسمانی، حیاتیاتی ضرورت ہے۔ بگاڑ تب پیدا ہوتا ہے جب اس جسمانی، حیاتیاتی ضرورت سے بڑھا کر نفسیاتی اور ذہنی ضرورت بنا لیا جائے۔

 

ٹیلی ویژن اسکرین کے ذریعے پاکستانی معاشرے میں جنسیت کو جسمانی، حیاتیاتی ضرورت سے بڑھا کر نفسیاتی ضرورت، ذہنی عیاشی اور  ایک ناقابل اعتراض عمل کے طور پر پیش کرنے کا آغاز ۸۰ کی دہائی میں "جانگلوس" کے نشر کرنے سے ہوا۔

 

اگر ہم کہیں غلط ہیں تو تصحیح کرنے کے لیئے آپ کے شکرگزار ہوں گے۔

Keeping secrets while spilling the beans — at the expense of national cohesion

The reported calls and meetings between the former Army chief and journalists while making some towering claims, damning confessions and startling revelations, raise concerns about the underlying motives for such interactions. One question that arises is whether the information shared with journalists is meant to serve a truthful purpose or to manipulate them for certain tactical advantages. The informal nature of these interactions makes them particularly susceptible to shaping narratives and spreading disinformation. The act of using journalists' "inherent lust for information" suggests an understanding of the power dynamics between those in positions of authority and those seeking information (for whatever purposes).

The manipulation of narratives through such interactions is not a new phenomenon, it has been practiced since ever. It is causing serious consequences for democracy and has destroyed public trust in institutions. The cultivation of information, misinformation and disinformation has led to a situation where public discourse is influenced by falsehood, furthering political agendas, division and polarization. The role of journalists in such situations is crucial, as they are expected to report the truth to the public and act as watchdogs on those in power. However, they are also susceptible to manipulation by those seeking to shape narratives or disseminate disinformation.

In this particular case, the individuals in question, Bajwa and Khan, are accused of lying to their teeth to journalists to advance their personal agenda and motives. The acts of lying to journalists, the journalists being de facto spox of politicians and political parties have already damaged the credibility of the journalists in particular and the media in general. The ultimate loss is using media as a tool to communicate with the public for the greater good. This must stop —  this act of madness, at the expense of national cohesion, must stop now before it is too late.

Hassan Saleem Awan

February 14, 2023

Data Breaches — National Security Nightmare

Shoaib Taimur, a data scientist, tweeted from his Twitter handle @shobz on February 10, 2023 at 18:22 hours PST:  "Yikes. 7.5 TB data breached from systems of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs? One of the leaks is regarding a harassment case. They have shared samples of the data, with the majority being emails". There have been reports of data breaches in Pakistan in the recent past. The data breaches / theft were reported at;

·         The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) — the biggest database of the country with every basic record of every individual, dead or alive, with biometrics

·         The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) — the biggest revenue collection authority of the state

·         The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) — the regulator of financial markets, banks and custodian of the state reserves

·         The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) — the regulator and the registrar of domestic and foreign businesses and enterprises in the country including non-profits. The companies of the Strategic Plans Divisions (SPD) which is responsible for top secret and highly confidential strategic plans also get registered with the SECP

·         Almost all the telecom companies operating in Pakistan

If these reports were true, these breaches or thefts of databases (population, demographic, business, financial, and telecommunications data of Pakistan) can have far-reaching consequences for the country's national security and its people. Below are some specific ways it could be harmful;

Intelligence Gathering: Hostile actors or agencies could use the stolen data to gather intelligence on key individuals, organizations, and infrastructure, potentially compromising the security of the country.

Espionage: Confidential business information, such as trade secrets, intellectual property, and sensitive financial data, could be used by foreign governments to gain an economic advantage over Pakistan.

Cyber Attacks: The stolen data could be used to launch cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, financial institutions, and government agencies, potentially causing widespread disruption and damage. There were rumours of such a cyber-attack when there was a nationwide power outage recently.

Election Interference: Stolen demographic data could be used to manipulate public opinion or interfere in elections, undermining the democratic process and causing political instability.

Financial Fraud: Stolen financial information could be used to commit fraud, such as identity theft or unauthorized access to bank accounts, causing direct financial losses to individuals and potentially destabilizing the country's economy.

For individuals and businesses, the threats include identity theft, impersonation, financial loss, loss of privacy, reputation damage, loss of consumer confidence, regulatory fines, and legal liabilities etc.

 

The recent data breaches in Pakistan pose a direct threat to the national security of the country. The information stored in these databases is highly sensitive and if it falls into the wrong hands, it can be used for malicious purposes that can harm the nation's stability and security. Therefore, it is imperative that the government and relevant organizations take swift action to improve the security measures of these databases and prevent future data breaches. This includes implementing strict security protocols, regularly monitoring systems for potential breaches, and conducting regular risk assessments to identify potential vulnerabilities. Individuals also have a role to play in protecting their personal and financial information by being vigilant and taking necessary precautions such as using strong and unique passwords and monitoring their financial statements for suspicious activities.

References

·         NADRA data leak: The government’s lack of concern over the data leaks is highly concerning | https://tribune.com.pk/story/2331199/nadra-data-leak

 

·         FBR reels under a major ‘cyberattack’ - Data centre compromised, all websites down | https://tribune.com.pk/story/2315712/fbr-reels-under-a-major-cyberattack

 

·         FBR data breach and its consequences | https://dailytimes.com.pk/806935/fbr-data-breach-and-its-consequences/  

 

·         SECP under fire after unprecedented data leak of confidential information | https://thepakistandaily.com/secp-under-fire-after-unprecedented-data-leak-of-confidential-information/

 

·         Zaki Khalid's Thread on Twitter Regarding SECP Data Breach | https://twitter.com/misterzedpk/status/1560797890204901376

 

·         Tension within SECP escalates as it tries to downplay data breach | https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/984987-tension-within-secp-escalates-as-it-tries-to-downplay-data-breach

 

·         Serious breach of cellphone users’ data | https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1005196-serious-breach-of-cellphone-users-data

 

·         Latest Personal Information of Millions of Pakistanis From All Telcos Goes on Sale | https://propakistani.pk/2022/01/17/latest-personal-information-of-millions-of-pakistanis-from-all-telcos-goes-on-sale/

 

·         Massive Breach: Data of Mobile Phone Users in Pakistan Available online for Free | https://www.phoneworld.com.pk/massive-breach-data-of-mobile-phone-users-in-pakistan-available-online-for-free/

 

·         Link to Shoaib Taimur's Tweet | https://twitter.com/shobz/status/1624036024224448512

 

BREAKING THE SHACKLES — NOW OR NEVER

It won’t be an exaggeration if we say that the military is the only true power center in Pakistan that has strong control over politics using judiciary and administration on 'as and when required' basis. It effectively controls media to maintain favourable discourse and to control the information. It successfully runs its enterprises autonomously with 'acquired' privileges. These additional facilitations, perks and privileges help in eliminating the competition in the market. Elimination of the competition in the market leads to military's monopolistic and cartel-like position in certain cases, causing a huge damage to the economy. It uses every possible tool, method and technique to maintain its dominance and control.

To peacefully end military dominance, control, and intervention in politics and power in Pakistan will require a multi-pronged approach that includes constitutional reforms, legal measures, political strategy, and the strengthening of democratic institutions. By doing so, we can build a better democratic and stable political environment that is conducive to human rights, freedoms, and progress. We can learn from Turkey's experience as they did the same for the very same purpose.

The first step would be to revise the constitution to clearly define the role and responsibilities of the military in the political system. The constitution must ensure that the military cannot interfere in the political process and that its personnel are held accountable for any violation(s).

The second step would be to pass laws that prohibit the military from interfering in politics and the administration of the country. These laws should provide clear penalties for military personnel who engage in political activities, and make it easier to prosecute those who violate the law. Additionally, the independence of the judiciary must be ensured, so that it is less susceptible to military influence.

Building a strong political consensus around limiting military dominance will be a critical part. This will require politicians to work together and build coalitions that can push back against military influence. Media must play a more critical role in holding the military accountable, and civil society groups must be empowered to act as watchdogs to ensure that military personnel respect the law and human rights.

It would be important to build and strengthen democratic institutions that can help to counter military dominance. Moreover, it will be important to create centers of democratic power that can serve as counterweights to the military, such as an independent and robust judiciary, an accountable and transparent government bureaucracy, and a vibrant and engaged civil society.

 However, an even bigger question arises here. How all this will be done?

Hassan Saleem Awan

February 09, 2023

Reimaging Pakistan — Nothing but re-capturing Pakistan

The ruling elites in Pakistan enjoy absolute power and control over everything through a combination of political, economic and social means. The strategy is the use of state apparatus such as bureaucracy (civil and military), police and judiciary to keep tight control over law and order and over dissent (if it emerges anywhere). Judicial, legal and constitutional systems are exploited and corruption is used to undermine the law. Economic resources, particularly natural resources, are controlled by the ownership of different enterprises and businesses or by securing favorable trade and investment agreements, licenses and permits in order to accumulate wealth and consolidate economic power.

Along with these institutional means, they also maintain their power through social and cultural means (our feudal, caste and class systems). Media is used to shape, reshape and control opinion and discourse. They have been exploiting religion, traditions and other cultural and social norms to justify their rule and power and to maintain social order. I mean, they have been exploiting every formal and informal mechanism and tool available to them, serving their interest of reinforcing their power, control and dominance and marginalizing the masses.

But after April 2022, people woke to reality. They came to this dark and painful realization of being manipulated since the inception of the country in the name of religion and politics by these ruling elites those are less than 10,000 in total number and if we further narrow them down, they belong to less than 100 families — all correlated, inter-connected and strongly linked together. It is like a spider web over and around them. This realization is so powerful and frustrating, simultaneously, that their entire discourse has changed. Now, they know, the people ruling them and political opponents who apparently oppose their rule, are in cohorts. This has turned the obedient and innocent into dissidents. This dissidence seems powerful and threatening that the ruling elites of Pakistan have come up with a new strategy — reimaging Pakistan. The people are tried to lure again in the name and guise of patriotism. This move seems nothing but a desperate attempt to keep power and control intact.

People remember how the USSR was brought down — first, the holistic takeover of every institution that resulted in the complete takeover of the state and then — the fall, the collapse. But people also remember Turkey, Venezuela and Iran — what a united and selfless struggle for a cause, can do. Only time will decide if the ruling elites of Pakistan succeed again or, this time, if the people will break the shackles of subjugation and slavery.

Hassan Saleem Awan 

Intelligence is a dirty business! When merged with politics — it becomes the dirtiest.

 

A Hypothesis Testing

 

Disclaimer: This is purely for hypothesis testing whether it is right or wrong.

 

A few days ago, our interior minister gave a statement in which he expressed the apprehension that outside agencies may try to kill Imran Khan.

 

Following this statement by the Interior Minister, the Chairman of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, Imran Khan, revealed in a conversation that another deadly attack on him had been planned. This time he added a name to the list of usual suspects. And that name was the name of the co-chairman of Pakistan People's Party, Asif Ali Zardari!

 

Being keenly interested in Pakistan's politics, I see these statements in a particular and certain context. Rana Sanaullah's statement is a foreclosure ploy, a preemptive move. The sole purpose of which is an attempt to divert possible charges in a direction that will push the investigations into a dead end in the event of a successful assassination attempt, God forbid, on Khan. The problems encountered during the investigation in the case of Shaheed Arshad Sharif are clear in front of us. It will be easy for the government to put the blame on others and delay the investigations.

 

But there is another side to this picture. Imran Khan expressing doubt on Asif Zardari right after Rana Sanaullah's statement raises a very important question for us. Can we assume that Khan is being fed wrong, false, inaccurate or incomplete information?

 

According to many newspaper reports, back-channel links were established between Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and Pakistan People's Party in the past. Have the planners and strategists focused on maintaining constant distraction between the supporters of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and Pakistan People’s Party so that no contact between the two parties can be established in the future? The tension between these two parties should be similar to the one that existed between the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and Pakistan People's Party in the past.

 

This move may have another purpose. If the planners and strategists are really serious about trying to eliminate / neutralize Khan, they have first diverted the possible charges and allegations to external agencies and then deliberately misinformed Imran Khan to have Asif Zardari included in the list of possible accused. So that the actual planners and strategists are given and paid minimal attention. In the case of Shaheed Arshad Sharif, in my personal opinion, he was double-crossed by his most trusted person. Apparently, this time this game is being played with Imran Khan.

 

But it is also quite possible that Imran Khan's fears and concerns are absolutely correct and genuine. Because the honourable acquittal of the high police officer from the court, involved in the murder of a Pashtun youth cannot be ignored. There have been serious allegations of involvement in extrajudicial and extra-constitutional killings on this police officer. This police officer's relationship with Asif Ali Zardari is not a secret matter.

 

Intelligence is a dirty business! When merged with politics — it becomes the dirtiest.

General Elections (GE) & Reforms — Some Concerns

General Elections (GE), if they are conducted freely and fairly, may indicate only one thing — political stability. And this is a “BIG IF” we all know. Political stability may be the first thing to achieve, however, it isn’t the ultimate thing that Pakistan needs right now. Let’s assume for a moment (no harm in daydreaming and building castles in the air as they cost us nothing) that Imran Khan / PTI wins the elections as being perceived by the majority of the political analysts. What roadmap does Imran Khan / PTI have to sway Pakistan away from the edge of economic collapse? In my humble opinion, there is none. So let’s not get our hopes high.

 

GEs’, whenever they are held, will lead us to a more chaotic political situation as no political party seems to gain a significant majority to form the government, independently. It will be a usual coalition cocktail or چوں چوں کا مربہ as it has always been in the past. So reforms too, seem highly unlikely to take place. In any case, there will be a huge controversy over GE’s results. No political party is going to accept poll results easily.

 

Moreover, I am afraid, upcoming GEs’ will see a new height of political violence if not planned, scheduled, and monitored appropriately with extreme care. By-elections such as the one in Daska were just a trailer.

 

So a coalition government or a hung parliament that will be a چوں چوں کا مربہ won’t be in a position to undertake/initiate reforms. Now, “reforms” is another interesting topic that we should discuss. The word 'reforms' is quite vague and generic and we should clearly understand its meaning when we use it. The questions I ask myself;

 

·         What do we mean when we say reforms?

·         Do we, really, need reforms? Or do we need a reboot? Or a complete re-doing of system over-hauling?

·         If reforms are necessary, where exactly they are needed?

·         This is a million-dollar question! Where to begin with this process of initiating reforms?

 

Now, if we have clearly defined the need, areas to be reformed, and the first step to take ... here are some bigger challenges that we'll have to face.

 

Who is going to initiate this process of reforms? Whomever he/she/it is, it must have absolute control over every organ of the state. Otherwise, resistance from everywhere — I repeat, from everywhere — would be impossible to cope with. This process of initiating reforms can only be executed if you are an authoritarian regime, military dictatorship or you have a 2/3 or 3/4 majority in the parliament. Any other way of execution will result in exactly the same as it ended after the 18th amendment. Rather than causing convenience, the 18th amendment has further polarized our political canvas. So as I stated earlier, there won't be any party with a heavy mandate from the public, and no martial law (even if there is any, the processed will be reserved when it is lifted).

 

The next point to ponder is, who will have the ownership and oversight of the process of reforms. After this, the challenge would be, how to craft reforms. As, apparently, we acutely lack the capacity for the same. Because if we had such ability, brilliance and able minds, we would not have to face this disastrous situation. Tasking old bureaucrats (the biggest credit we give to any of them is وہ رشوت نہیں لیتا but we are OK if that goof is incompetent) would be a futile exercise. Reforms means, the real reforms. Not like changing from "Police Force" to "Police Service" and changing the color of the shirts from grey to green. I don't see anyone who can lead this initiative.

 

Reforms need a longer period of time to be crafted, executed, implemented and tested. 05 years in government is not enough. So it seems like we’ll continue moving in circles and that too, backward. A grand dialogue may help in building some consensus, though, the probability is very low.

 

Let's be realistic and take a keen look around us. In April, 2022 we observed immense frustration and a kind of hatred among the masses against the military's obvious involvement in Khan's ouster. That feeling, the extent of that feeling ... it is gone. This is Imran Khan we should blame who has openly acknowledged that he was in negotiations with فوج and his followers blindly accepted it without raising an objection. What was a taboo before audio/video leaks, is a new acceptable norm.

 

Last — but not least, if PTI wins and gets a 2/3 majority, PTI’s past performance record, its capacity to deliver, infighting for the power, a habit of taking U-turns, lack of vision and team … all these factor, along with some known unknowns, compel me to remain a sceptic.

 

Hassan Saleem Awan

January 18, 2023